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Abstract 
The present paper tests the effects of governance structure on organizational performance. While most 
studies in public management are concerned with the impact of different types of managerial behavior 
on organizational performance, the context of the governance structure is mostly neglected. The Dutch 
institutional context is distinctly different from the U.S. context and characterized by schools clustered 
in boards with specific governance characteristics: legal form, denomination, multiplicity, and size. 
We propose that school boards’ governance structures have a contingent impact on school 
performance, affecting the way(s) that managerial activities of school principals affect school 
performance. We hypothesize that (1) school performance significantly varies at the school-board 
level; (2) school board complexity negatively affects school performance; (3) school board governance 
structure significantly affects the level of principals’ managerial activity, but (4) in different ways for 
different dimensions of managerial activity; (5) School principals’ managerial activities have different 
effects on school performance for schools residing under different governance structures. We test our 
hypotheses on a nested dataset that includes (a) measures for different dimensions of school 
principals’ managerial networking and human capital, scope of internally oriented management 
activities, and (b) measures tapping the governance structure of the school boards in which the schools 
are nested. These data are combined with data on school pupils’ scores on standardized tests, as well 
as a wide range of control variables that capture school, staff, and pupil characteristics (N = 422). 
Regression analyses show partial support for our hypotheses. Indeed, governance structure affects 
managerial behavior but does not (co-)determine the transformation of managerial behavior into 
school performance.  
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Introduction 
While evidence on the hypothesized link between public management and performance has started to 
accumulate in the past decade (cf. Boyne et al. 2005; see also Heinrich and Lynn 2000; Forbes and 
Lynn 2005; O’Toole and Meier 1999), surprisingly little systematic research has addressed this 
relationship until relatively recently. In addition, although there exist at length conceptualizations 
about (new) forms of “public governance,” even less systematic research is available that explicitly 
tests how (public) governance structures affect organizational performance. When narrowed down to 
the concept of organizational performance, governance can be defined as the set of activities and 
institutions that regulate—both formally and informally—the process of public service delivery. Thus, 
governance activities have a broader scope than management activities. Governance involves activities 
2 
 
such as strategic decision-making and management, the exercise of internal oversight and (financial) 
control related to formal accountability, external administrative representation, and the organization of 
internal representation of personnel. Governance activities are structured formally, often with a strong 
legal component well-embedded in public law. 
 Public management is a set of management activities which provide organizations with the 
necessary organizational stability to improve upon their past performance, buffer organizations against 
turbulent shocks in their environment, and tap necessary resources from the organizational 
environment (O’Toole and Meier 2011). Comparing the two definitions, there is no clear distinction 
between governance and public management—as many of the activities serve the same ultimate goals. 
The core differences are procedural and relational, since the governance activities of “boards” often 
impose the checks and balances on the management activities of “principals”.  
 There is clear empirical evidence that public management activities affect organizational 
performance. Studies of Texas school districts, performed during the last ten years, revealed that 
internally oriented management activities (securing organizational and personnel stability, acquiring 
human capital) make an important difference for school district performance. They show that internal 
management; in particular the attraction of highly qualified personnel, has a strong positive effect and 
can strengthen the organizational stability necessary to improve upon past performance. The core 
proposition is that—in spite of decades of fashionable theories of innovation, change, and public 
sector reform—public organizations still need organizational stability to enhance their programs.  
 In addition, the externally oriented management activities (frequent managerial networking with a 
large scope of relevant external organizations and actors) also strongly affect school performance. 
These activities buffer organizations against turbulent shocks in their environment, and tap necessary 
resources from the organizational environment. Akkerman and Torenvlied (2011) and Torenvlied et al. 
(2013) show how different types of networking activity tap specific resources from the organizational 
environment—with specific effects on organizational performance. 
 There is much less empirical evidence on the effects of governance activities and governance 
structure on organizational performance. Building on the existing studies of management and 
performance in education, the aim of the present paper is to extend the existing models of management 
and performance with the impact of the governance structure in which organizations are embedded. 
We focus on the activities of school managers—school principals in primary education—and on the 
governance structure of the school boards in which their schools are embedded. There are no strong 
theoretical arguments that would support the existence of a direct effect of the governance structure of 
school boards on school performance. Alternatively, we build an explanatory model for governance 
effects on performance. We propose that the governance structure of school boards indirectly affects 
school performance, through its effect on the managerial behaviors of school principals—which in 
their turn affect school performance. In addition, we propose that the governance structure of school 
boards has a contextual effect on school performance: the relation between the managerial behaviors 
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of school principals and school performance will be distinctly different for different types of school 
boards. 
 From these propositions we derive our first hypothesis: the school boards’ governance structure 
significantly affects the managerial activities of their school principals. From our explanatory model 
also follows that the effects of governance structure vary between different types of managerial 
activity. Hence, managerial behavior is not only significantly affected by the governance structure, but 
managers also behave differently in different governance contexts. This is our second hypothesis. 
Subsequently, we contextualize the relation between school principals’ managerial behavior and 
school performance. Our third hypothesis states that the effects of managerial activity on school 
performance are different for school boards characterized by different types of governance structure. 
 We test the hypotheses about the contextual impact of school board governance on performance 
using a cross-sectional dataset of 1,272 Dutch primary schools nested in 571 school boards. We use 
one indicator for school performance, for the year 2009, which is the authoritative, standardized test 
taken by school pupils at the end of the eighth grade. We explore how much of the variation in school 
performance can be attributed to the level of school boards and to the level of the schools themselves. 
We combine these data on performance with survey data that measures school principals’ quality of 
human capital and four dimensions of their managerial networking activity. To capture the school 
boards’ governance structure we use information from secondary sources on the school boards’ legal 
form, denomination, size, and multiplicity. These data are, in turn, combined with a wide range of 
control variables that capture school, staff, and pupil characteristics.  
 
THE RESEARCH CONTEXT: DUTCH PRIMARY EDUCATION 
The context of the present study is formed by the Dutch system of primary education. The managers in 
this research context are the principals of primary schools. The governance structure in this research 
context is formed by the boards of these schools. In the Netherlands, 6,901 primary schools and 1,069 
school boards are responsible for the education of more than 1.5 million school pupils in the ages 
between four and twelve. Dutch primary schools have two main responsibilities: (a) to qualify pupils 
by promoting their cognitive skills, primarily in language and arithmetic, and (b) to socialize pupils by 
promoting their social and moral development in citizenship behavior (Dutch Education Council 
2009).Accountable for the attainment of these goals, and school performance, are the school principal 
and, ultimately, the school board.  
 
School principals 
School principals must translate the two broad responsibilities into the educational program of their 
school. In addition, they coach teachers; develop plans for pedagogical quality, student care, and 
quality control; and monitor pupil performance. School principals also have considerable 
administrative duties associated with the day-to-day management of the school. They are responsible 
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for the planning of activities, human resource management, and the development and maintenance of 
buildings. School principals are the main representative of the school in external contacts and therefore 
maintain relationships with organizations and actors in the school environment, for example: the 
parent committee, the school board, local government, public libraries, youth care, the Inspectorate of 
Education, and test suppliers. 
 Dutch primary schools are subject to Dutch education law, which is partly a national concern and 
partly decentralized to local governments. There is no financial sponsoring of education from the 
private sector: all schools are entirely government-funded by a “block grant” from the Dutch Ministry 
of Education, Culture, and Science. These grants are based primarily on school size: the number of 
pupils who attend the primary school. Block grants are, however, partly dependent on “pupil weights”: 
specific categories of pupils have their own weights, which are related to parental background 
characteristics, such as educational level or immigrant background (Ladd and Fiske 2011). Thus, pupil 
characteristics, at least partly, translate into the available school budget. In addition, primary schools 
are allowed to request (relatively small) voluntary parental contributions, to be designated to 
extracurricular activities specifically such as school outings, additional teaching materials, and 
festivities. Accountability for these additional expenses is regulated through the parents’ council.  
 Dutch primary schools vary with respect to their educational philosophy or denomination. This 
variation developed from the principle of “freedom of education,” which is embodied in the Dutch 
Constitution. This principle embraces the freedom for Dutch citizens to found schools, their freedom 
to determine the principles of faith for their schools, and their freedom to organize teaching (De 
Vijlder 2000: 1). Since the beginning of the nineteenth century any community, parent, or other 
initiator is allowed to establish a primary school on the basis of their own initiative. Almost 70 percent 
of all primary schools in the Netherlands are denominational schools.1 In the Netherlands, parents are 
free to choose the primary school for their children to attend. However, most primary schools have the 
right to refuse children, for example because they have only limited space for students. Primary 
schools also have some discretion to actively apply selection criteria, for example the geographical 
distance of pupils´ home to school. Denominational primary schools may also give priority to pupils 
with a particular religious background. The other 30 percent are non-denominational schools. These 
schools are obliged to accept all children, regardless of their religious background. Denomination is 
not tied to an educational approach. Primary schools may base their teaching methods on specific 
educational approaches, such as Montessori education, the Dalton Plan or Jena Plan concepts. 
 All schools are assessed on the same final attainment levels. Most prominent is the standardized 
CITO test which provides information about both pupils’ progress and the school’s performance. The 
attainment levels have driven the standardization of educational programs offered by primary schools. 
Certified test suppliers provide the standardized tests. The standardized attainment levels make it 
                                                 
1 Roughly 29 percent have a Roman Catholic background, 26 percent have a Protestant denomination, and 11 
percent have another denominational background (Islamic, Hindu, Jewish, or Waldorf school). 
5 
 
possible to compare—and monitor—performance for all primary schools. The Inspectorate of 
Education makes “risk analyses” for each primary school and assigns, on the basis of these risk 
analyses, a specific “oversight arrangement” to each school. Other compliance standards exist for 
performance management, the documentation of pupil achievements, the school’s social climate, or 
the application of educational programs. Because the inspectorate’s reports are published on the 
internet, all evaluations are easily accessible to the general public. The inspectorate’s benchmarking 
activity has direct consequences for the popularity of primary schools because parents are, in principle, 
free to choose the primary school for their children. Schools that fail to comply with the performance 
standards are subjected to an intensive supervision regime and an annual evaluation (which is made 
public again). Schools that that continue to fail ultimately risk losing their funding. 
 
School boards 
Primary schools are governed by school boards. About 30 percent of all school boards in the 
Netherlands are responsible for a single school, and most school boards govern more than one school 
(sometimes even more than 60 schools). Formally, the school board is accountable for the internal 
organization, the personnel and employment policies, and the financial management of the school—
and ultimately for the school’s performance (Turkenburg 2008). The typical school board member in 
Dutch primary education holds a part-time position, is male, has received higher education, and has a 
relation with education by being a parent (in 1998 in primary education 87 percent of the board 
members had a child attending one of the schools. Specialist board members gradually become more 
common.  
 Despite their final accountability, most school boards delegate much authority and discretion to the 
school principal. In practice, most school principals make the important decisions about the school 
budget, they establish the school’s educational curriculum, and they supervise personnel processes. 
School principals also maintain direct contacts with the parents’ council and other key actors and 
organizations—they are the school’s primary representative in most external relations. 
 During the past decade, the Dutch government has encouraged an increase in the size and scope of 
educational organization, probing towards school-boards governing larger numbers of (more diverse 
types of) schools (Turkenburg 2008). The purpose of this program of “educational upscaling” was to 
stimulate administrative cooperation between schools and, hence, to strengthen the capacity for 
governance and management of primary schools.  
 The policy of “educational upscaling” had a strong effect on the size of school boards. As a result 
of this policy, the number of primary school-boards dropped from 1,722 in 2003 to 1,066 in 2009. In 
reaction, the number of schools also slightly dropped. Currently, in The Netherlands about 45 percent 
of all 1,066 primary schools boards govern a single school. These school boards are denoted as “single 
school boards” as distinct from “multi-school boards”. In many single school boards, the school 
principal plays a strong role in the board. The average school board in The Netherlands governs six to 
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seven schools (but there are school boards that govern up to 60 schools). Another indicator for the size 
of a school board is the number of pupils that receive their education in one of the schools that reside 
under the board. In 2009, the average primary school board was responsible for the education of 1,452 
pupils (ranging widely from 9 to 18,279 pupils). There is no straightforward relation between number 
of board members and school board size: whereas the average single school board has seven members, 
the average multi-school board has six board members. 
 The Dutch policy of “educational upscaling” has not only resulted in an increase in size of the 
school boards; it also resulted in an increase in the scope of school boards. Many school boards in the 
sector of primary education merged with school boards governing schools in the sector of secondary 
education. In 2009, 2.8 percent of the school boards in the Netherlands were school boards that 
governed both primary- and secondary schools. The average number of primary- and secondary 
schools governed by these diverse school boards is 16 primary schools and 4 secondary schools—
although schools in secondary education tend to be much larger.   
 
Board governance structure 
School boards vary strongly with respect to their governance structure. In the first place, just like 
primary schools, school boards tend to organize along the lines of their educational philosophy or 
denomination. In principle, we observe that non-denominational schools are governed by a “public” 
school board, catholic schools by catholic school boards, and so on. About 14 percent of all school 
boards in primary education have are non-denominational, 17 percent has a Roman Catholic 
background, 35 percent a Protestant background, and 34 percent a miscellaneous (“other”) 
denominational background. The difference in the distributions of school boards and schools in 
denomination is roughly explained by the number of schools governed by school boards. Protestant 
schools, and most schools with an “other” denominational background, predominantly have a single 
school arrangement. In addition, 14 percent of the school boards with an “other” denominational 
background consist of collaborations between schools from different denominations, including non-
denominational schools.  
 In the second place, school boards vary with respect to their legal form. Non-denominational 
schools are generally governed by the municipal council, or a governing committee / foundation 
accountable to the municipal council (Dutch Inspectorate of Education, website 2013b). 
Denominational schools are generally governed by a founding board, which has either the legal form 
of an “association” or of a “foundation.” Dutch law states that both foundations and associations are 
legal bodies deployed for non-commercial purposes. The main difference between the foundation and 
association is that a foundation is a legal body without members, whereas an association is a legal 
body with members, i.e., pupils’ parents (Oosterling & Vink 2011). The highest decision-making body 
of an association is the general assembly of members, who can fully partake in the association’s 
decision-making process (either by responding to the board’s proposed decisions, or by a specified 
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caucus putting decisions on the agenda. The association’s general assembly—which is all members—
also directly elects its board members. By contrast, in a foundation all the decision-making power is 
concentrated within the board. In a foundation, the board members are appointed by the board itself. 
About 59 % of all Dutch primary schools are governed by a foundation, and approximately 37 % is 
governed by an association. The remaining 4 % is, in a different legal form, primarily directly 
governed by municipal council.  
 From 2010 onwards, all school boards required to legally separate their “executive” from their 
“internal control” functions (PO-Council 2010).2 This separation can be achieved in two different 
ways. The first approach is by means of a structural separation, installing a “two-tier” board. A two-
tier board consists of an executive board, holding all executive principals, and a separate supervisory 
body, holding all non-executive principals. In the case of a structural separation, two different 
governance models can be distinguished: (a) the board-principal model, and (b) the supervisory-board 
model (Oosterling & Vink 2011). The board-principal model refers to a governance structure in which 
the board (consisting mainly of volunteers, e.g., parents) has a supervisory function and the school 
principal is responsible for the administrative tasks, i.e., the school principal is part of the school 
board. This is different in the supervisory-board model, which refers to a governance structure with a 
professional executive board and a separate supervisory body (usually volunteers). In that model the 
school principal has no official executive powers. 
 The second approach is by means of a functional separation, installing a “one-tier” board. In a 
one-tier board all the principals—both executive principals and non-executive principals—form one 
board. An important example of the one-tier board is the board-of-principals model. In this model, all 
the executive principals (usually professionals) and non-executive principals (usually volunteers, 
parents) form the same organizational body. In the board-of-principals model, the school principal has 
neither official executive power. In 2008 almost all single-school boards (about 40 percent of all 
primary school boards) applied the board-principal model (Turkenburg 2008). About 10 percent of the 
Dutch primary school boards applied the supervisory-board model. About 50% of the primary school 
boards applied the board-of-principals model.  
 Finally, two specific school board characteristics, mentioned above, affect the governance structure 
of school boards. The first characteristic is the distinction between single school boards and multi-
school boards. In the single school board arrangement the school principal takes a relatively strong 
position and, due to the fact the board governs only one school, complexity is relatively low. The 
second characteristic is governance complexity, which is affected by the size of the board (the number 
                                                 
2In recent years, various administrative interlayers have arose between the board and the school; in particular, the 
development of a middle-management is a key (Turkenburg 2008). Middle-management forms a link between 
the board or the supervisory board and the school principals of the individual schools. School boards that govern 
many schools make more use of middle-management than school boards that govern fewer schools. 
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of schools in the multi-school arrangement) and by the scope of the board (whether the board includes 
schools from different educational sectors). 
 
Institutional context 
Dutch primary education is embedded in a relatively homogeneous institutional environment 
(Torenvlied and Akkerman 2012) comprised of national rules, regulations, and procedures, as well as 
sector-wide collective bargaining agreements that set minimum standards and job classifications for 
personnel policies at school (Franssen, Pastors, and Van Rooijen 2010). Local government shapes the 
local conditions for the provision of education by deciding about the allocation of budgets to school 
improvements, the housing of schools, and public space and public safety issues. Thus, the local 
environment of primary schools provides important opportunities and restrictions for the process of 
providing primary education as well. Primary schools tend to cooperate in local networks—sometimes 
within the context of a particular school board—that are defined by their denomination. However, 
many of their tasks and responsibilities are quite comparable in terms of: school management, the 
maintenance of external relations, curriculum development, procurement of funding and subsidies, and 
human resource policies.  
 
HYPOTHESES ON EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 
The concept of governance is an intricate and highly complex one, which refers to the ways that 
modern states, public sectors, or public bodies, deal with policy implementation and public service 
delivery. Governance is central in the “traditional” public administration model, when it aims to align 
the procedures, output, and outcomes of politics, policy-making, and public management. The concept 
of governance was broadened more recently to recognize the importance of “governance without 
government”—for example policy-making in collaborative networks or multilevel arrangements—
although such forms of governance existed for centuries. Another recent development in governance is 
the introduction of “performance management”, with the “New Public Management” as a much 
contested governance concept. 
 A more recent development is the study of “New Public Governance”, which has the ambition to 
deepen our understanding of core explanations in the discipline of public administration (Osborne 
2010, 11), for example with regard to policy implementation and public service delivery, or designing 
legitimate and sustainable improvements of public service delivery. Although intellectually inspiring, 
conceptually these approaches to governance issues are metaphorical, metaphysical and, at times, even 
mythical—blurring boundaries between the activities of politicians, administrators, regulators, public 
managers, and street-level professionals.  
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Governance-level effects on school performance 
The present paper aims to introduce a more evidence-based approach to the relation between 
governance and public management. In essence, we could define governance as a set of activities and 
institutions that regulate, both formally and informally, the process of public service delivery. School 
boards thus govern the processes within the schools under their authority. The core assumption is that 
the governance structure of school boards would affect school (management) activities and, hence, 
school performance. If this assumption holds, we should be able to observe systematic variation in 
school performance across different school boards. In more general terms, organizational performance 
must have a component that varies not only significantly between organizations, but also between the 
governance bodies that pool different organizations. For the context of primary education, this 
prediction is specified in our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There exists significant variation at the school board-level in school performance 
and managerial strategies. 
If there exists significant variation in performance and managerial strategies at the school board-level, 
variables tapping the proper explanatory mechanisms at the board-level would explain that variation. 
However, it is far from evident how variables that capture, for example, the structure of governance 
bodies affect the performance of the organizations under their authority. The legal form of the 
governance body affects the transparency in board-level decision-making and internal control which, 
ultimately, result in better school performance. In addition, some governance bodies are more complex 
in nature than other governance bodies—for example in terms of the number of organizations under 
their authority. Highly complex governance bodies are less able to properly coordinate and control the 
organizations under their authority—which would reduce their performance. This is summarized by 
hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 2: Complexity of school-boards negatively affects school performance. 
 
The governance—management nexus 
The core assumption of public management theory is that the activities of public managers affect 
public sector performance. Indeed, there is a considerable body of evidence that both internally and 
externally oriented management activities affect the performance of organizations in the public sector. 
Empirical studies are most abundant in the educational domain, with school district superintendents 
and school principals as the key public managers. Embedding public management theory in the 
governance context in which managers must operate is no easy task, and the essential question 
becomes whether, and how, the structure of governance bodies interacts with public management 
activities in affecting the performance of public sector organizations. For the educational context this 
question translates into the contingent effect of school board variables on the effects of managerial 
strategies of school principals. A contingent effect of school-board structure operates, most likely, 
through distinct, though indirect mechanisms. In the first place, the structure of the school board will 
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impose restrictions on, and provides opportunities for, school principals to engage in specific 
managerial activities. Hence, we expect that school principals systematically differ in their managerial 
activities, dependent upon the characteristics of the school board under which they reside. This 
expectation leads to two related hypotheses. The third hypothesis states that a direct effect exists of 
governance structure on managerial activity. 
Hypothesis 3: School board governance structure significantly affects the level of principals’ 
managerial activity. 
The next hypothesis states that specific dimensions of managerial activity are related to specific 
governance structures. For example, we may expect that school principals who reside under a board 
composed of municipal council there is a much stronger incentive to engage in managerial networking 
with local government than for school principals who reside under an association or a foundation. 
Hypothesis 4: Effects of school board governance structure on managerial activity are different for 
different types of managerial activity. 
Finally, we expect that the mechanisms under which specific types of management activities affect 
school may differ between governance bodies, that is: governance structure will have a contextual 
effect on the determinants of school performance.  
Hypothesis 5: school principals’ managerial activities have different effects on the performance of 
schools in school boards characterized by different types of governance structure. 
 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
Data 
To test our hypotheses we use three, pooled datasets of primary schools. The first dataset contains 
information from a survey among principals of Dutch primary schools. In the framework of the 
“Dutch School Networks & Learning (DSNL) project” we held a nation-wide survey among principals 
of Dutch primary schools. The survey data were collected in early 2010, using an internet survey. 
Principals of all 6,896 Dutch primary schools were invited by mail and email to participate in the 
survey. The invitation included a personal link to the project website. A reminder was sent after two 
weeks. After six weeks, the response rate was 19.55 percent (n = 1,348). This rate is comparable to 
response rates reported by other studies of Dutch school principals,3 and is substantial given the work 
pressure on school principals and the prevalence of survey research in this sector. Nevertheless, an 
elaborate non-response analysis shows that schools in the sample do not differ with respect to a large 
number of relevant characteristics, such as school size, location, denomination, or quality assessment 
by the inspectorate for education (see Torenvlied and Akkerman 2012, 466 for more detail and 
extensive discussion).  
                                                 
3 For example, the web-based survey of the Dutch Education Council (2008,31) had a response of 15.6 percent. 
The response rate in the Texas studies is 55 percent (Meier and O’Toole 2003, 692).  
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 The second component is a dataset from the Dutch Inspectorate for Education, which provides 
information about various indicators of school performance for many different years, as well as a wide 
range of control variables. We selected the year 2009 for further analysis because the survey, held in 
spring 2010, asked the school principals explicitly for their activities in the previous year. The third 
dataset contains the characteristics of school boards, for which we also selected the year 2010. The 
three datasets were matched by using: (a) each school board’s unique identification number, which is 
tied to (b) each school’s unique identification number, assigned by the Dutch Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Science—a four digit code which allows the ministry to identify primary schools as 
separate educational units. Below we discuss the structure of the dataset and the construction of the 
different measures in the analysis.  
 
Structure of the dataset 
In the dataset 1,272 primary schools are nested within 571 school boards. Table 1 presents the nesting 
structure in more detail. 103 schools in the dataset are governed by a “single-school” board. The other 
468 boards in the dataset are “multiple school” boards, governing more than one school. For 282 
multiple school boards, there is only one school in the dataset and for 123 multiple school boards there 
are two schools in the dataset. For the remaining school boards there is data on more schools available, 
varying from about 100 boards with three or four schools and the other 60 school boards up to even 19 
schools. Table 1 also provides insight in the average size of schools. The average school size is 
somewhat larger for boards with fewer schools, indicating that larger boards govern relatively more 
schools with a smaller size. 
—Table 1 about here— 
Measurement 
Organizational performance 
The dependent variable in the present study is the school’s average score of pupils on a standardized 
test which is taken in the second half of the eighth and final grade of primary education. Roughly 75 
percent of all primary schools participate on voluntary basis in this “CITO” test—which is named after 
the independent institute which develops, supplies, and administers the scores. The CITO test score is 
based on three sub-tests: for language (100 questions), arithmetic (60 questions), and study 
competences (40 questions). Pupils’ scores on these 200 questions are transformed on a scale between 
501 and 550.4 This range was chosen in 1976 by CITO to avoid confusion with intelligence tests, 
                                                 
4 In the transformation, several steps are taken (Boxtel, Engelen, and De Wijs 2011). Because each year 
completely new items are used, item-response is applied to obtain the difficulty of items and homogeneity of the 
scale and sub-scales—identifying items that fit poorly on the scale. The item-difficulty is further calibrated using 
samples of pre-tests using tests from previous years. Comparability of test scores across years is guaranteed by 
estimating a normal curve equivalent. Finally, the 501—550 scale is devised as a linear equivalence 
transformation using the distribution of the earlier year. The standard error of the equivalence procedure is 
estimated by statistically comparing the variance in pupil scores for different groups of schools, using different 
years as a baseline. These tests show that the procedure is robust for different equivalence procedures. 
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while retaining a proper range (50 points) to map the responses from 200 questions. In 2009, about 
154,000 pupils participated in the test—the average score of pupils was 535.5 (CITO 2009). Each 
year, the test is calibrated, evaluated and adjusted.  
The CITO scores are very important in the Dutch system of education.5 Secondary education is 
split between different sub-categories (special education, vocational education, and higher secondary 
education) and many different sub-levels within these categories. Pupils’ are referred to a specific 
level of higher secondary education by their teacher, in collaboration with representatives from 
schools in secondary education. The referral of pupils to secondary education is based to a large extent 
on their individual CITO test score.6 Some secondary schools apply a strictly defined minimum CITO 
score in their admittance decisions.  
The CITO test has not been without controversy and challenges. Standardized tests clearly do not 
measure all the relevant aspects of an education system. Thus, some primary schools use intelligence 
tests as the basis for pupil referral. In addition, all primary schools are allowed to exempt specific, 
well-defined categories of pupils from the test: (a) pupils with severe language problems who have 
been living in the Netherlands for a period shorter than four years, (b) pupils with an indication for 
special secondary education, and sometimes for lower levels of vocational secondary education. Thus, 
our data does not include test scores of pupils referred to special education or second language pupils. 
Despite this room for discretion, pupils’ average CITO test-score (corrected for pupil 
characteristics) is considered to be an authoritative indicator for school performance by the Dutch 
Inspectorate for Education—and by most teachers and parents as well. The inspectorate uses pupils’ 
average test-scores (among others) to distinguish between insufficient, (very) weak schools on the one 
hand and average / strong schools on the other hand. For each school the criterion value depends on 
characteristics of its pupil population. Information about the CITO test-scores is important in the news, 
and reported on the internet (with freely accessible average test-scores per school). However, to be 
allowed to use a school’s average CITO-score for analysis, the explicit consent is required by each 
school. Therefore, we asked the school principal to tick a specific button in the web-based survey to 
indicate whether the principal agreed upon the use of the average CITO score data. About 75 percent 
of the school principals who responded to the survey agreed to use the data.7 
                                                 
5 Two other performance indicators used by the inspectorate are derived from the CITO test scores: the 
percentage correct answers to the 100 language questions and to the 60 arithmetic questions, respectively. These 
two derived indicators are highly correlated with the CITO test scores (ρ = 0.87 and 0.88 respectively; n = 817) 
and generally capture the same construct. Rich assessment data from inspector reports are not available annually, 
except for underperforming schools that are put under a regime of oversight by the inspectorate. 
6 More precisely, the pupil’s percentile score is used rather than the CITO test-score to take into account cohort- 
and year effects.  
7 On the basis of the consent rate of 75 percent of all school principals in our survey—combined with the 
percentage of schools that use the CITO score (75 percent)—we may expect that we have 56.25 percent of our 
cases valid for analysis. On the basis of 1,348 schools in our dataset this percentage combines to 758 valid cases 
of performance. In the 2009 dataset we have 718 valid cases for performance. Thus, the available cases roughly 
are what we would expect on the basis of the national data. The number of valid cases reduces to N = 422 
because of missing cases in the various independent variables and controls. We analyzed the more parsimonious 
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School board governance: structure and complexity 
We include two variables that capture governance structure. In the first place, the legal form of the 
school board is captured by including a dummy for “association” (n = 170). Hence, the “foundation” 
(n = 356) and “other” legal forms together form the reference groups, with the other form being 
containing a relatively small group (n = 45). In the second place, the organization of school boards in 
school board denominations is captured by including dummies for “Roman Catholic” (n = 151), 
“Protestant” (n = 169) and “Other” schools (n = 109), with non-denominational schools (n = 142) as a 
reference group. Thus, the included dummies tap variants of “non-public” school boards—since 
nondenominational schools are the most “public” of the schools.  
Governance complexity is tapped, in the first place, by a school-board level variable, which 
describes the governance structure of the school board in terms of a “single school” board versus a 
“multiple schools” board. The dummy variable (“single” = 1) describes the situation in which a single 
school has its own board versus situations in which a school is under the umbrella of a board with 
multiple schools. Governance complexity is tapped, in the second place, by the “size” of the school 
board: a variable that indicates the number of schools governed by the school board. Governance 
complexity is tapped, in the third place, by a variable [not included yet in this paper] which captures 
the situation in which a board governs schools from different sectors (e.g. primary education, 
secondary education, and / or vocational education) or from the sector of primary education 
exclusively. The latter situation is tapped by a dummy variable (categorical board = 1).  
Table 2 provides information about the association between different characteristics of the 
governance structure of school boards. About 65 percent of the school boards in our dataset are 
foundations, about 30 percent associations, and only 5 percent have a different form—mainly 
governed by municipal council. The associations govern significantly fewer schools than do the 
foundations or other legal forms. Denominations are distributed roughly equally, with other 
denominations having a smaller share. The cross-tabulation shows dome interesting results. Most 
Protestant and roughly 50 percent of school boards with “other” denomination organize in 
associations. Non-denominational schools and Catholic schools organize in foundations. Finally, the 
small proportion of “other” legal forms is almost exclusively reserved for the 25 percent of non-
denominational schools who are governed by municipal council. The implication is that empirically, 
we cannot fully distinguish between the dimensions of legal form and denomination in the governance 
structures. 
—Table 2 about here— 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
model specifications using all valid cases for each of these models (N > 422) to check for robustness of results 
and found no substantive differences in results compared to those presented in the results section. 
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Internal management 
We use the variable quality of human capital to capture internal management activity. This variable 
should tap the successful attraction and development of human capital within the organization, 
resulting in high-quality teachers. In the context of Texas school district superintendents O’Toole and 
Meier (2011, 153) ask superintendents to rate the quality of their principals’ management skills and 
professional development, the quality of experienced teachers, as well as their agreement with the 
question that “our people can make any program work.”8 We adapted this measure for the 
management level of school principals, and asked principals to rate the quality of their team of 
teachers on a scale between zero and ten, resulting in a 10-point human capital scale. 
 
Managerial networking 
In the present paper, we follow O’Toole and Meier’s (2011) measurement of managerial networking 
activity as captured by the frequency of relations with external organizations.9 A detailed list of 
external organizations with which school principals could maintain relations was determined on the 
basis of interviews with key informants in the education domain, school principals, and members of 
school boards. This procedure resulted in a list of 41 different external organizations and relevant 
actors. Managerial networking variables were measured by asking each school principal—for each of 
these organizations—“how frequently do you interact with this type of organization?” (Meier and 
O’Toole 2003; O’Toole and Meier 2011). This frequency of interaction was measured using a five-
point scale, with categories ranging from “never” (0), “yearly” (1), “several times per year” (2), 
“monthly” (3), “weekly” (4), and “daily” (5).  
 To measure managerial networking we selected three sets of organizations that represent key 
national and local actors and organizations (see also Torenvlied and Akkerman 2012).10 National 
government actors and organizations are: national-level external organizations: (a) the “financial 
agency DUO,”  which is the semi-autonomous government agency responsible for budgeting and 
finance; (b) the Dutch “Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science,” which is the national 
government department responsible for formulating educational policies and programs; (c) “test 
suppliers,” which are corporations that develop standardized tests for primary education; (d) the 
autonomous “Inspectorate of Education,” responsible for monitoring school performance and auditing 
the schools on a wide variety of performance indicators. All organizations in the “intensity of national 
                                                 
8 O’Toole and Meier (2011, 154) also included an item “I am quite likely to recommend a subordinate for a 
superintendent position in another district.” This item has a relatively low factor loading compared to the other 
items. 
9 This assumption is strong, because interaction frequency does not fully capture the richness of network ties that 
may exist between organizations, nor does the interaction frequency provide information about who initiated the 
contact. The Texas school data reveal that taking the initiative in networking and managerial networking activity 
are highly correlated variables (cf. Goerdel 2006). 
10 We assume these three dimensions tap the most relevant externally oriented management activities of school 
principals. There are many other potentially relevant sets of external actors and organizations, such as other 
school principals, but a close examination of all these dimensions falls beyond the scope of the present article.  
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networking” scale are involved in the process of assigning accountability to schools with respect to 
their specific pupil achievements, educational climate, and financial management. Reliability 
coefficient Cronbach’s α = 0.70 indicating that the scale has sufficient internal validity. 
 Local government actors and organizations are: (a) “members of city council,” who are the 
representatives in the local political arena; (b) the “aldermen,” who are the chief administrators in 
local government, and (c) the “municipal department of education,” which is the main local 
government department responsible for implementing education policies in the local domain. The 
items on local networking activity form together a scale with, considering the small number of items, 
an acceptable reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.66).  
 A third set of relevant local organizations are those providing youth care and child protection:  (a) 
“attendance officer, (b) police, (c) municipal youth service, (d) regional youth care. The items on local 
networking activity form together a scale with an acceptable reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.65). For all 
three networking scales, we computed a sum scale, standardized with respect to the number of items in 
the scale. 11 Finally, we added a single item “networking activity with the school board” to tap the 
intensity of interactions between school principal and the school board from the principal’s 
perspective. 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
[to be included]. 
—Table 3 about here—  
  
Control variables 
We use a number of control variables that aim to tap differences in the pupil population, school 
characteristics, characteristics of the school team composition, and characteristics of the school 
principal.  
Pupil population. The variable percentage disadvantaged pupils taps the percentage of pupils who 
carry a “pupil weight,” which indicates that the pupil needs additional support and resources.12 For the 
analyses of managerial networking we follow O’Toole and Meier (2011) who control for relations that 
tap negative feedback from the environment. In the context of Dutch primary education a number of 
                                                 
11 The use of standardized sum scales allows us to interpret effect sizes of managerial networking activity in a 
straightforward way (as they represent average interaction frequencies). Factor analyses reveal that—for each of 
the managerial networking scales—one factor exists (Eigenvalue > 1) on which all items load strongly and 
positively. Correlations between the standardized sum scales and factor scores are very high (ρ = 0.98). 
Additional analyses show that the pattern of findings is robust to the measurement approach used here. 
12 The percentage of disadvantaged students is based on the so-called “pupil weights”. Students are assigned 
specific weights if: (1) both parents have only attended elementary school (0.25); they live in a foster home 
(0.4); both parents work in a circus or fair (0.7); one or both parents live at a trailer park (0.7); they have a non-
Dutch cultural background; or if the father or mother (care taker) has finished a lower professional education at 
most; or if the highest-earning parent is employed in a profession in which (s)he does physical or hand labor, or 
is unemployed (0.9 if one of these conditions is satisfied). The numbers in parentheses are the weights used to 
calculate the additional funding for these disadvantaged pupils. 
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organizations are concerned with pupils who are in a disadvantaged position. We include, as a control 
variable, the school principal’s networking activity with four “child protective” organizations (a) the 
attendance officer, (b) the police, (c) youth services provided by the provincial authorities, (d) youth 
care provided by the municipality. The aim of this construct is to tap the networking activities of 
school principals that aim to resolve difficult behaviors that arise in pupils: drop-out behavior, 
violence and criminal behavior, as well as social issues associated with these behaviors. The four 
networking frequency items together form a sufficiently reliable “child protective networking” scale 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.69). We expect that a school’s score on this control variable is negatively associated 
with school performance.  
School (team) and principal characteristics. We control for school size by including the number of 
pupils. Administrative intensity of the school is a stabilizing factor defined as the employment in 
management and staff functions (in full-time equivalents) as a proportion of all personnel (in full-time 
equivalents) employed in the school. We include three characteristics that control for confounding 
effects that arise between different school principals: (a) the number of hours per week a school 
principal spends on his/her job as a school principal, (b) the age of the school principal, and (c) 
experience as captured by the number of years that the school principal is has worked as head of the 
specific school. 
 
RESULTS 
We apply a cross-sectional design to test the hypotheses. Because schools are clustered within boards, 
we computed robust (clustered) standard errors. A multilevel analysis produces biased estimates 
because for many school boards (n = 385; 67 percent) only one observation is available. 
 
Variation at the board- and school-level 
A key descriptive question for the study of the governance of multiple organizations is how the core 
variables in the educational production function vary at the different levels of explanation. At the 
school board level public governance explanations apply. At the school-level public management 
explanations apply. Hypothesis 1 states that there exists significant variation at the school board-level 
in school performance and in managerial strategies. The structure of our dataset—with schools nested 
within school boards—provides us with the opportunity to decompose the variance we observe in the 
performance CITO test-score and our core independent variables into a board-level component and a 
school-level component. Table 4 presents the percentages of variance at each level. 
—Table 4 about here— 
Table 4 shows observe that 30 percent of the variation in CITO test score is at the level of the school 
board, whereas the remaining 70 percent can be found at the level of the school. Thus, explanations 
that can be found at the level of the school board, account for 30 percent of the variance in school 
performance. This amount is quite substantial, given that it is based on the average test scores of 
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individual schools. Likewise, the responses of school principals with respect to their networking 
activity also vary systematically between school boards—with the exception of national networking 
this is also around one third of the total variance. Hence, variables at the level of the school board 
must drive at least a substantial part of the variation in networking behavior of school principals, and 
hypothesis 1 is corroborated.  
By contrast there is no significant variation at the board-level in internal management—the internal 
management seems to be exclusively determined by variables at the school-level. Board-level 
variation is even higher for the school-level control variables. Even though these variables are 
measured at the school-level, there is substantial variation at the board-level, which shows that 
variables at the board-level must account for administrative intensity, size, and task difficulty. This is 
different for principal-level variables, for which the variance can only be found for roughly 20 percent 
at the board-level. Indeed, board characteristics may drive partially the selection on basis of 
experience, principals’ engagement and the time they spend on their job.  
 
Explanation of managerial behaviors 
The first part of our explanatory theory specifies the effects of governance structure on managerial 
behavior. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the governance structure of school-boards significantly affect the 
levels of principals’ managerial activities. Table 5 provides insight in a test of this hypothesis. For the 
quality of human capital governance variables have no effect. This is no wonder, since there is no 
significant variation in this variable at the school board-level. For the five types of managerial 
behavior (the four dimensions of managerial networking activity and improving the quality of human 
capital) we specified the same regression model, including board characteristics, denomination, school 
controls, and principal controls. Table 5 shows that the legal form of the school board does not affect 
any of the managerial behaviors of school principals. We tested several specifications of dummy 
variables (both with and without controlling for denomination) but found no effects of legal form on 
managerial behavior. This is different, though, for the school arrangement: principals in single-school 
boards are significantly more active for all the dimensions of managerial networking, with the 
exception of child protective networking. The effects of arrangement makes perfect sense, because the 
principals of schools with a single school board arrangement are typically member of the board 
themselves, and the key administrative stakeholder in both board and school. Hence, they must be 
more active in the external representation of their school (board). 
—Table 5 about here— 
 The number of schools in the school board produces mixed results: it has a negative effect on 
national networking activity and positive effects on child protective networking and board networking. 
It does not affect school principals’ local networking activity. Finally, school board denomination 
affects the different types of managerial networking behavior in different ways, without any clear-cut 
18 
 
pattern. Thus, we have evidence that school board governance variables significantly affect managerial 
networking activity, which corroborates hypothesis 3.  
 What is more, there is no clear-cut pattern in the school-board level determinants of all managerial 
networking variables. This was predicted by hypothesis 4. Local networking activity is positively 
affected by single school arrangement, and Protestant schools tend to be less active in local 
networking. National networking activity is also positively affected by single school arrangement, and 
principals who reside under multi-school boards tend to be less actively networking in the national 
arena when the number of schools in the arrangement increases. Principals of Catholic schools are 
more active in national networking. Child protective networking is hardly affected by governance 
variables at the board-level, but the principals of non-denominational school and Protestant schools are 
significantly more active in child protective networking. Finally, the networking activity of a principal 
with the own school board significantly increases for schools in single school boards, and for multi 
school boards with a larger size. Denomination does not affect board networking significantly.. 
 As for the school control variables, pupil characteristics primarily affect the intensity of child 
protective networking. Principal’s experience tends to significantly reduce networking activity, and 
increase the quality of human capital. Reversely, the time investment of principals is directed towards 
managerial networking rather than human capital quality. Overall, principal controls most significantly 
and strongly affect principals’ internal management strategy of promoting the quality of human capital 
at school.  
 
Board-level effects on school performance 
The second part of our explanatory model specifies the effects if governance structure on 
organizational performance. We first explore, in Table 6, whether any direct effects exist of 
governance structure on school performance—as measured by the average pupil scores on the 
standardized CITO-tests for each school. Table 6 presents a series of nested models using ordinary 
least squares model with robust, school-board clustered standard errors. We observe in model 1 that 
single school boards perform significantly better than do schools residing under a school board with a 
multi-school arrangement. Catholic schools also perform significantly better than do schools with 
another denomination; however this denomination effect disappears when controlling for school 
characteristics in model m2 onwards. Inspection of the other models reveals that the singe school 
board effect is quite robust for different model specifications, including our management variables and 
various controls for school- and principal characteristics. Hence, hypothesis 2 is corroborated with 
respect to the governance arrangement: schools in the simple arrangements fare much better than those 
in the more complex governance arrangements. However, for multi-school arrangements this effect 
disappears: schools within relatively complex (larger) multi-school arrangements do not perform 
worse (or better) than in simpler governance arrangements. Table 6 also shows that the explanatory 
power of the school arrangement variable is quite low, whereas school controls explain most of the 
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variance. The management variables have significant effects in for specifications—especially quality 
of human capital—as previous studies of this dataset already revealed. 
—Table 6 about here— 
 Hypothesis 5 stated that school principals’ managerial activities have different effects on the 
performance of schools in school boards characterized by different types of governance structure. To 
test hypothesis 5 we interacted the governance structure variables with the different management 
variables. However, these interactions yielded not any significant result. Thus, hypothesis 5 is rejected 
by the available data. School performance is affected directly and positively by the single board 
arrangement of the school board. Public management variables do have noticeable effects on 
performance. However, there is no evidence that governance structure moderates or reinforces the 
effects of public management variables.  
 
Contextual effects of school governance 
We performed a further analysis to test hypothesis 5 by finding out whether governance structure is a 
contextual variable. As a contextual variable, governance structure does not constrain (moderate, 
reinforce) the effects of public management on organizational performance, but rather affects the 
mechanisms under which public management affects organizational performance. Hence, in different 
governance contexts, we may expect different effects of public management. Table 7 presents the 
results of two nested OLS regressions of school performance analyses for each of the three legal 
forms: the association, the foundation, and the other form of governance, predominantly governance 
by municipal council. For the “other” legal form we specified a more parsimonious model because of 
the small number of cases.  
—Table 7 about here— 
 Again we observe, in Table 7, schools residing under single school board arrangements perform 
much better than do schools under the multi-school arrangement, albeit that the number of schools 
does not affect performance significantly (except for a slight positive effect in the context of other 
school boards). In addition, Table 7 reveals that school controls also have fairly robust effects across 
governance contexts: larger schools perform better while schools with relatively many disadvantaged 
pupils perform worse. Finally, the positive effect of quality of human capital is also robust across the 
contexts. The main difference is to be found in the effects of managerial networking. For principals 
residing under an association we observe a negative effect of child protective networking, whereas 
such an effect is absent for other governance contexts. For the “other” governance context—in which 
municipal council is at the helm—we observe strong positive and significant effects of local 
networking and national networking. These effects are likely to be induced by the political nature of 
that specific governance context. 
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CONCLUSION 
The present paper reveals how governance structure and public management interact in the provision 
of primary education in the Netherlands. About 30 percent of the variation in school performance can 
be attributed to variables at the level of the governance bodies (school boards) accountable for the 
schools under their authority. The governance structure of school boards has a direct effect on the 
performance of the schools under its authority. This effect works through the integration of 
governance and management. Schools in single school boards perform significantly better than 
schools in multi-school boards. For single school boards, the administrative integration between 
management (the school director) and governance (the school’s exclusive board) is complete. The 
integration between governance and management makes administrative decision-making more 
efficient and effective, promoting school performance.  
 Governance structure, however, has no straightforward effects on school performance other than 
the single- versus multi-school arrangement. For multi-school boards we find no negative direct effect 
of governance complexity in terms of the number of schools under the board’s authority. We neither 
find indirect effects of governance structure on school performance. Variables that tap school boards’ 
governance structure are associated with school directors’ managerial networking activity in particular 
dimensions. However, the only dimension of managerial networking related to school performance, 
child protective networking, is not affected by the governance structure of school boards. Hence, for 
the context of primary education in the Netherlands governance structure matters for the activities 
public managers employ, but this association between governance and management has no further 
implication for school performance.  
 Finally, we find no strong evidence either for contextual effects of the legal form of governance on 
school management and performance. For the “other” legal forms of school boards—primarily those 
governed by municipal council—managerial networking with local and national government strongly 
affects school performance. For associations, child protective networking is significantly associated 
with school performance. However, such differences are not marked. 
 The conclusion of the present paper is, at least for the context of the provision of primary education 
in the Netherlands it is not governance structure but rather public management that explains 
organizational performance. Internal and external management by school directors, especially 
attracting high quality human capital, is more conducive for performance than is the particular 
structure of school governance. The pivotal role of school directors as public managers is further 
emphasized by the relatively high performance of schools in single school board arrangements, which 
administratively integrate the governance and management functions in the provision of primary 
education.  
 Nevertheless, we must remind that that about 30 percent of school performance can be attributed to 
explanations at the school board level. Most in particular, the level of professionalization of school 
board members is often put forward as an important explanation for school board performance. The 
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professionalization pertains to the competences of board members in terms of their expertise, 
experience in administration, and their ability to professionally cooperate. Additional data about the 
characteristics of individual board members is available. However, pooling these data with the school 
director data yields such a low number of cases that such a study will have an exploratory nature at 
most. The present study also has some clear other limitations. The most important limitation is that the 
study is confined to the year 2009 and that, until now, we have not yet collected longitudinal data on 
the management activities of the school principals. Consequently, we are not yet able to arrive at 
causal statements about the extent to which performance may drive governance structure and public 
management activities. Additional surveys held in the near future and thereafter will provide new and 
exciting data that enable us to specify true longitudinal models of management and organizational 
performance. 
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Table 1.  
Nesting Structure of the Dataset 
    School size (# pupils) 
# schools in dataset # Boards # Schools  Average S.d. 
Single school board      
- 1 school 103 103  246 108 
      
Multiple school board      
- 1 school 282 282  240 127 
- 2 schools 123 246  233 141 
- 3 schools 65 195  206 124 
- 4 schools 41 164  229 134 
- 5 schools 25 125  208 145 
- 6 schools 15 90  220 124 
- 7 schools 12 84  248 114 
- 8 schools 3 24  212 120 
- 9 schools 2 18  208 121 
- 11 schools 1 11  248 128 
- 14 schools 1 14  326 179 
- 19 schools 1 19  252 158 
      
Total 571 1,272  229 131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.   
Cross-Tabulation of School Board Denomination and Legal Form. Frequencies and 
Size (Number of Schools in Board between Brackets) 
                               Legal form school board 
           Foundation  Association Other        Total 
Non-denominational       104             0            38       142 
             (2.81)          n.a.        (2.37)        (2.69) 
                
Catholic       150             1             0           151 
             (2.71)        (7.00)          n.a.        (2.74) 
                
Protestant     49           118             2           169 
             (2.73)        (1.60)        (4.50)        (1.96) 
                
Other           53            51             5           109 
             (1.40)        (1.24)        (1.60)        (1.33) 
                
Total        356           170            45           571 
             (2.54)        (1.52)      (2.38)        (2.23) 
Note. Cramér's V = 0.55 (moderate association); Board size and Denomination: F(3, 
567) = 17.74; p < .001; Board size and Legal form: F(2,568) = 18.64; p < .001. 
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Table 3.  
Descriptive statistics of the study – to be included 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  
Decomposition of Variation of Core Variables in Board-Level and School-Level Variance 
 Percentage of Variance 
# Boards # Schools  Board-level School-level 
Performance  
   Average Cito test-score 392 718 30 70 
 
External Management  
   Local Networking 557 1,200 34 66 
   National Networking 554 1,207 19 81 
   Child Protective Networking 555 1,189 28 72 
   Board Networking 557 1,216 33 67 
Internal management 
   Quality of Human Capital 535 1,100 12* 88 
 
School-level Controls  
   Administrative Intensity 571 1,272 53 47 
   Number of Pupils 571 1,272 33 67 
   % Disadvantaged Pupils 571 1,272 37 63 
 
Principal-level Controls  
   Experience 565 1,249 18 82 
   Commitment 536 1,115 0* 100 
   Engagement 525 1,079 21 79 
   Hours spent 562 1,257 24 76 
* Non-significant. 
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Table 5.  
Regression of Five Types of Managerial Behavior: Effects of Legal Form and Board Characteristics 
    Local      National Child Protective   Board     Quality of 
  Networking   Networking   Networking   Networking  Human Capital 
Board characteristics 
  Form = Association†    0.053        0.043        0.003       -0.155        0.110      
  Single school board    0.306***     0.270***    -0.032        1.312***    -0.047      
  Number of schools    0.001       -0.015***     0.017*       0.045***     0.001   
 
Denomination‡ 
  Catholic   -0.028        0.172***    -0.130**      0.194       -0.019      
  Protestant   -0.183**      0.013       -0.085        0.050       -0.041      
  Other   -0.153*      -0.051       -0.421***     0.052        0.016      
    
School controls 
  Adm. intensity    0.003        0.001        0.004        0.007        0.005      
  Number of pupils    0.018        0.021        0.070***     0.000       -0.025      
  % Disadv.pupils    0.003**     -0.001        0.011***     0.003       -0.002*     
 
Principal controls 
  Experience    0.008***    -0.005**     -0.006**     -0.005        0.017***   
  Commitment    0.013        0.014        0.008        0.041**      0.034**    
  Engagement    0.007**      0.001        0.002        0.006        0.015***   
  Hours spent    0.346**      0.143        0.494***     0.063       -0.401**    
 
Constant    1.407***     2.121***     1.914***     2.720***     6.723***   
R2     0.052        0.041        0.145        0.077        0.077      
N     1,040        1,047        1,030        1,054        1,043      
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .005; †Reference categories are “foundation” and “other” form.  ‡Reference category = non-denominational; 
Significance levels based on robust (board-clustered) standard errors. 
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Table 6.  
Regression of CITO Test-Scores: Effect of Legal Form, Board Characteristics, and Management (N = 637 schools) 
     m1           m2           m3           m4           m5       
Board characteristics  
  Form = Association    0.010       -0.160       -0.145       -0.228       -0.219      
  Single school board    2.406***     1.716**      1.611**      1.651**      1.567**    
  Number of schools   -0.096       -0.023       -0.016       -0.020       -0.026      
 
Denomination† 
  Catholic    1.170**      0.096        0.062        0.073        0.054      
  Protestant    0.054       -0.598       -0.565       -0.554       -0.552      
  Other    0.803        0.263        0.148        0.183        0.293      
 
Management 
  Local networking                              0.364*       0.311        0.279      
  National networking                             -0.170       -0.188       -0.156      
  Child prot. netw.                              -0.410**     -0.363*      -0.352*     
  Board networking                              0.028        0.020        0.034      
  Human capital                                           0.550***     0.556***   
 
School controls 
  Adm. intensity                  0.037        0.035        0.033        0.033      
  Number of pupils                 0.329***     0.343***     0.355***     0.339***   
  % Disadv. Pupils                -0.136***    -0.132***    -0.132***    -0.133***   
 
Principal controls 
  Commitment                                                       -0.125**    
  Engagement                                                        0.020      
  Hours spent                                                        0.285      
 
Constant  534.589***   536.184***   536.683***   532.560***   533.082***   
R2     0.046        0.365        0.371        0.381        0.385      
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .005; †Reference category = public; Significance levels based on robust (board-clustered) standard errors. 
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Table 7.  
Regression of CITO Test-Scores for the Three Legal Forms: Contingent Effects of Management and Board Characteristics
        Association               Foundation                   Other 
      M1           M2           M1           M2           M1           M2 
Board characteristics  
  Single school board    1.000        1.737*       3.296***     3.146**      1.549        2.570**    
  Number of schools    0.056        0.255       -0.016       -0.017        0.274        0.737*      
 
Denomination†
  Catholic                              0.166        0.165                                
  Protestant    2.224        2.043       -0.769       -0.729             
  Other    3.169        2.947       -0.754       -0.799         
 
School controls  
  Adm. Intensity    0.075        0.064        0.036        0.034        
  Number of pupils    0.846**      0.901**      0.280**      0.297**      0.409        0.358      
  % Disadv. Pupils   -0.123***    -0.120***    -0.139***    -0.136***    -0.093***    -0.061**    
 
Management 
  Local networking                 0.275                     0.143                     1.850***    
  National networking                -0.040                    -0.122                     1.386**     
  Child prot. netw.                -1.077**                  -0.196                    -0.622      
  Board networking                -0.311                     0.026                    -0.423      
  Human capital                 1.200**                   0.316*                    0.771      
 
Constant  531.796***   525.304***   536.343***   534.283***   535.007***   522.628***   
 
R2     0.293        0.376        0.409        0.408        0.221        0.389      
N       128          128          483          483           52           52      
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .005; †Reference category = public; Significance levels based on robust (board-clustered) standard errors. 
 
